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The Eighteenth Amendment-Its Validity
-Public Opinion
In Symphony Hall, Boston, April 8th, 1927,1 Dr. Nich-

olas Murray Butler, President of Columbia University, made
use of this language, "on a dark March afternoon in 1920 I
sat in the Supreme Court of the United States, in the room
whose walls had echoed with the voices of Clay and of
Calhoun, of Webster and of Benton and the men of long
ago, and I listened to the conclusion of a great argument.
The case at bar involved the validity of the so called
Eighteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States. Was that proposed amendment a valid exercise of
the power conferred by the fifth article of the Constitu?
tion
In front of an attentive court stood the tall, slim figure
of an acknowledged leader of the American bar, one of the
most distinguished public servants of his generation, who
was presenting the argument against the validity of the
amendment. He looked at the clock, behind the chief
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justice and saw that it was within two or three minutes
of the hour when the court would rise, and he concluded
with these exact words:
'If your honors shall find a way to uphold the validity
of this amendment, the government of the United States as
we have known it will have ceased to exist. Your honors
will have found a legislative authority hitherto unknown
to the Constitution, and untrammeled by any of its limitations. Your honors will have decided that two-thirds of a
quorum of each house of the Congress, with the support
of a majority of a quorum of the Legislatures of 36 states,
may enact any law relating to the life, the liberty, or the
property of its citizens, to the form and fabric of the government, or to the bill of rights itself without recourse and
without appeal. In that case, your honors, John Marshall
need never have sat upon your bench.'
It was a tense moment when Elihu Root closed. The
argument was ended and the court rose.
Mr. Chairman, I made a silent vow, there and then,
that, if the court should find a way to uphold that amendment, despite that argument, I would give such strength
and such time as were at my command to appeal to the
American people to undo that wrecking of our government.
The Eighteenth Amendment is the law, and as such
we owe it obedience, but we owe to the underlying principles of America an appeal to the people whose Constitution, whose judiciary, and whose Legislatures, they arean appeal to undo that damage and to correct that stupendous error.
My appeal is from the judicial and legislative branches
of the people's government to th€ people themselves to
take out of that Constitution a provision in the form of an
amendment which is not an amendment, which is substantive legislation, which is a revolutionary act, which has no
likeness to anything that is in the Constitution, which has
nothing to do with the form and structure of the govern-
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ment or with the limitation of powers granted therein, but
which is an ordinary municipal law, operating directly and
almost irrevocably upon the whole body of our citizenship."
It is not the purpose in this paper to discuss the value
or the merits of the Eighteenth Amendment, but the validity and its relation to public opinion in its adoption and
ratification. And as Dr. Butler's opening statements are
an epitome of Mr. Root's argument to the Supreme Court
with a few additions, the discussion will be confined to the
propositions contained in those statements resolved in the
following:
1. The amendment is revolutionary.
2. It is substantive legislation.
3. It is an addition to, and not an amendment of, the
Constitution.
4. It is ordinary municipal legislation.
5. It has no likeness to anything in the Constitution.
6. It was secured by a two-thirds majority of a quorum of Congress and ratified by a majority of a quorum of
three-fourths of the legislatures, instead of two-thirds of
all the members of Congress and a majority of all the
members of the legislatures of three-fourths of the states.
It will be conceded that all the above propositions are
true except the Fifth and if they cannot be justified by the
history, custom, rules and regulations of the Congress and
the various legislatures and Article V of the Constitution,
then Mr. Root's reasoning is sound and the 18th Amendment is invalid and the Court should have so declared.
First-The amendment is revolutionary. Is there
anything strange and unusual about that? These United
States were born in a revolution, traced through fire and
blood and smoke to a splendid consummation. There seems
to be no objection to that, on the contrary everybody
glories in it even though written in blood. But in less than
ten years from that consummated revolution there was another one, this time accomplished in peace. In the winter
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of 1786 and 1787, the Congress of the United States authorized a convention to convene in Philadelphia. The delegates were commissioned to meet and propose amendments
to the Articles of Confederation-reconstruct the old existing Government. Did they do it? Did these delegates
obey their mandate received from the people?
Those fifty-five men ranging in age from 27, the
youngest, to 81, the oldest, went into that building on
Chestnut Street, Philadelphia, turned to the first room on
the left, on the first floor, closed the door, locked it, appointed a sergeant at arms to keep it locked, and four long
months they were holding sessions as secret as a Masonic
Lodge. They did not take the people into their confidence.
And the people were wondering, surmising, speculating,
and even rumoring that those men were proposing a monarchy, and expected to invite the youngest son of George
III, who was a Bishop somewhere, to be King of America.
And while the rumoring was going on outside, the "fiftyfive" inside were formulating, launching and finally prosecuted to successful culmination the most profound, fundamental, and humantiarian revolution ever recorded in the
world's history. They deliberately proposed "scrapping"
the old government and setting up an entirely new one.
To use Dr. Butler's language, they proposed "wrecking"
the then existing government.
On September 17, of that eventful year, those delegates,
after violating their mandates, adjourned, having instructed
their presiding officer, George Washington, to destroy all
records of the proceedings, send the document they had
framed with a letter of advice, to the Congress in New
York, virtually requesting that government to go and commit suicide. And strange to say, that government meekly,
yet reluctantly, proceeded to do it. Revolution! There
was one that was so far reaching as to astonish the civilized
world, and brought about peacefully quite an improvement over the one a few years before. The only speech
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Washington made during those four summer. months was
when he said, "if the states will not accept this new government, the next one will be drawn in blood."
Mr. Root and Dr.Butler don't seem to have any objection to a revolutionary document consisting of more
than four thousand words, brought about by faith breakers,
and trust violators, but, hold up their hands in holy horror
when a little revolutionary document, consisting of 44
words, amending the older, larger one, is brought about,
and no faith breaking, nor trust violating in doing it.
Neither was it brought about in secret. It was done openly, both by Congress and the 46 legislatures. That much
at least can be said for this second, peaceful revolution.
If this last one is invalid because revolutionary, how much
more so is the Constitution itself invalid because revolutionary.
Second and Fourth-It is substantive legislation. It
is ordinary municipal legislation.
These two may be taken together meaning substantially the same thing. Substantive and municipal legislation operate upon the individual citizens as such. It has
not to do with the form and manner or modes of government. It is contended that because the 18th amendment is
substantive municipal legislation and not constitution making, therefore, it is invalid as a constitutional measure.
Is there anything in the Constitution itself that operates on the citizens directly or any class of citizens, that
partakes of the nature of municipal and substantive legislation ?
Article I, Sec. 9, reads thus: "And no person holding any
office of profit or trust under them (United States) shall,
without the consent of Congress, accept of any present,
emolument, office, or title of any kind whatever from any
king, prince, or foreign state." Here is a class of citizens
numbering hundreds of thousands that this proviso operates upon directly. It is just as much ordinary municipal
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legislation as the 18th amendment.
But it may be objected that this is not a fair example,
as those persons are connected with the government, and
therefore are a part of the structure of the government.
Very well, that objection may stand and the point yielded.
Article XIII of the amendments provides "Neither slavery
nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime
whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall
exist within the United States, or any place subject to
their jurisdiction." There is a proviso free from limitations
operating in the form of a prohibition upon the citizens of
the United States-all of them and not any class. There
is an example of the purest substantive municipal legislation as can be found. No act ever passed by Congress or
legislature is more so. That amendment changed no part
of the form of government. It pertained to no mode or
manner of governmental functioning. Congress never
owned slaves. No Southern state ever owned slaves. It is
doubtful if ever a county, township, city or town ever
owned a slave. It was individual slave holders that were
affected, and them only. Mr. Root did not object to this
precedent. Had he been in the New York legislature there
is not much doubt but that he would have voted to ratify
this 13th amendment.
If the 18th amendment is invalid because of its being
ordinary, substantive, municipal legislation, then the 13th
amendment is invalid for the same reason.
Again, is this 13th or 18th amendment the first and
only instances where constitution making resulted in ordinary, municipal legislation? The individual states of the
Union had made constitutions both before and after the
Federal Constitution was framed. All of them have numerous commands and prohibitions operating directly upon
the citizens of those respective states. And every command or prohibition is a law, substantive, municipal. You
can not have a law without a law maker. Where is the ad-
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vantage in drawing the fine distinction between words and
phrases such as "constitution maker" and "law maker."
Both result in law. It avails nothing to say that, if the
result of the supposed Constitution making is municipal
law, it is invalid and therefore is no law. The only substantial question is, who made the law whether municipal
in nature and form or otherwise? If the people in their
sovereign capacity made the law, it is a constitution, fundamental, basic, supreme. If the delegated legislature makes
the law it is a statute, and the legislature being merely an
agent of the people must carry out the authority, expressed or implied, committed to it.
The previous people-made law, even though part of
it is municipal in nature and form, resulting in a constitution, is the charter from which the agent, the legislature,
gets its authority. If the agent exceeds that authority
derived from the charter, its act is a nulity and void, unless
ratified by the principal. If the principal enacts a law, it
is answerable to no power within the state. The agent may
do less than the principal and may do as much, if authorized; it may not do more. But who will contend that the
principal may not do more than the agent? If the principal
has authorized or delegated the agent to pass municipal
law, it inherently reserves the power to repeal that law,
or pass one if the agent fails to enact one. These principles
are axiomatic and need no proof.
Now, applying this doctrine thus enunciated to the
people of the nation as the principal and the Congress as
the agent of the principal, the people, it has equal force, and
equally adaptable and fitting. It is even more extensive in
its operation than when applied to state powers. The
national power, principal or agent, acting within its proper
sphere, extends downward over the state. The state
power, principal or agent, does not extend upward over
the nation. The national power, the principal, has decreed
that "this Constitution, and the laws of the United States
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which shall be made in pursuance thereof, and all treaties
made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the
United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the
judges in every state shall be bound thereby, anything in
the Constitution or laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding."
The supreme power of the land, the people, has decreed and placed in the Great Charter, the Constitution,
the manner in which it shall be amended. That Supreme
power has been liberal and provided two ways for bringing
about amendments to the Great Charter.
Eleven times, the power to amend has been exercised,
and of the two methods provided, the same has been used
every time. Why single out the 18th amendment and question its validity, when it was passed in the exact manner
and with the same exact carefulness as all the other
eighteen were passed?
Third-It is an addition to, and not an amendment of,
the Constitution.
In perusing the first ten amendments, we find all of
them to be entirely new. They do not amend anything already in the Constitution. They change nothing already
provided. They are mere additional protections to the individual citizens. Indeed that is why they were desired
and proposed. It was contended that the states and the
Federal government had their protection and the individuals
had none. If this contention be true, then when they are
provided, why are they not additions and not "changes or
amendments?" Others contended that the original document did provide protections, but to clear up any doubt
the ten additions were suffered to go in, and they were so
intended. The seventh might possibly be construed as an
exception and be conceded to be an amendment. The
ninth and tenth are merely declaratory of what might be
found in the Constitution by fair inference.
In 1847, James Buchanan, as Secretary of State of
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Polk's Cabinet, formally proclaimed over his official signature, after enumerating all the amendments, that they
were the "additions to, and amendments of, the Constitution of the United States."
But what fair thinking person can object to something
being added to the original fundamental law of the land,
if the people in their soverign capacity as law maker think
it necessary to be added? This is a progressive, expanding,
complex age we are living in. If the exigencies of the
times demand something by addition, the people will do it,
and there is no power higher that can prevent them from
so doing. And by fair inference the framers of the Constitution intended this to be so, when they provided a way.
It is a great strain on one's imagination to suppose that
those far-seeing men intended the peop!e to be put in a
straight jacket and not be able to provide for a possible
contingency in the vast future in which they expected the
Constitution to endure.
In all deliberative bodies, motions are amended by addition, subtraction or substitution. Suppose the Congress
should propose to change the 18th Amendment by an
amendment. In doing so, it is proposed to substitute legalizing the traffic in intoxicating liquors in place of prohibiting the traffic in all the territories of the United States;
and this, were it adopted by two-thirds of both houses and
ratified by three fourths of the State legislatures, would
any one, or could any one, rightfully contend that this
would not be a legal and correct procedure? It certainly
could not. And yet it would be an addition to the Constitution, and something new and different. The 18th amendment would then be a legalization instead of a prohibition.
' Who will deny the right of the people of the United
States of amending the Constitution prohibiting great,
ponderous airplanes and ships, carrying hundreds of passengers and many tons of freight, from passing over
densely populated sections of the country? Who will

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
deny the right of the people of authorizing the construction of a terminus of an eight or ten way tube for trains
and autos connecting Europe and America, or even prohibiting such construction? These certainly would be something new and vastly different from anything that is in the
original Constitution and something the framers never
dreamed of. Can any one suppose that those framers ever
intended that the people should be hampered in their means
of self protection, or of self advancement? Most assuredly
we can not think so.
Should the Congress enact a law under the police
power prohibiting such acts, then some high-priced
lawyer would be arguing before the Supreme Court that
such an act of Congress would be contravening the 14th
amendment of the Constitution denying the equal protection of the laws, the due process of law, or the equal privileges and immunities of the law. If Congress should refuse to act, the people could go over the head of Congress
and amend. If Congress should enact, then the people
could annul.
Fifth-There is nothing like it in the Constitution.
This we deny. The 13th amendment is something like the
18th. But this objection is largely answered in number
three. The 13th amendment is prohibitive in its nature,
operating on the individual. The 18th is prohibitive in
nature, operating on the individual.
The subject of slavery was a very delicate subject for
the Convention of 1787 to act upon. What was done about
it was by way of a compromise. It was loaded with dynamite. If touched off, it would have wrecked everything.
There were those who would have prohibited it in the
whole country. There were those who would have extended it everywhere and for all time. It was only a circumstance of luck or fortune, or something that prevented
drastic action one way or the other in the convention. Had
slavery been prohibited everywhere, or had it been legalized
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everywhere, in either case, there would have been in the
original Constitution something to which the 18th amendment could be likened. But circumstance, luck or fortune
postponed it till it came finally in the form of an addition
to the Constitution in 1865.
Once more it is contended that even though the 13th,
14th and 15th amendments are something new and different
and unlike anything in the Constitution, they were the
natural result and outcome of a great civil war, and,
therefore, were necessary, as if that were the only good
and valid excuse for passing amendments. But is it not
infinitely better and more desirable to accomplish the same
results or like results by peaceful methods than obtain
them by war or as a result of war? Especially is this so
when the objectionable thing is the cause of the war directly or indirectly. We believe the great majority of the
American people think thus, and will use every peaceful
means within their power to attain these desirable results
rather than resort to war.
The 13th, 14th and 15th amendments were secured after 1,000,000 men were either sent to their premature graves
or maimed for life, $4,000,000,000 shot away in smoke and
the country set back forty years. The 18th amendment was
secured by preaching, lecturing, praying and voting
through many years-coming gradually and with little
noise. We have learned how to do things since '61 to '65.
It is sometimes argued that even though the first ten
amendments might be considered as additions, they may
also be considered as practically a part of the original
Constitution. Dr. Butler so contends. But how is this?
There were 224 amendments proposed by the various states
in their debates on ratification. Out of the 224, only
seventeen were seriously considered by Congress. Of the
seventeen, only twelve were finally adopted and sent to the
states for ratification. Of the twelve, ten were ratified.
Just which of the 224, or of the seventeen, or the twelve,
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can be said to be "practically" a part of the original Constitution? Evidently, only those that finally happened to
be adopted and ratified, some say. But this conclusion is
too far fetched.
The l1th and 12th amendments can, by fair argument,
be considered as properly and really amendments and not
additions. They actually change something already in the
original. The 13th is something added. The 14th, 15th,
16th, 17th and 19th change-amend something already in
the Constitution.
Sixth-It was secured by a two-thirds majority of a
quorum of the Congress and a majority of a quorum of the
legislatures, instead of a majority of all the members
elected.
This was the chief contention of Mr. Root before the
Supreme Court. In the light of the history, custom, rules
and regulations' of legislative bodies in America, it is difficult to understand how Mr. Root could in good faith make
such an argument. In doing it he proves too much. According to his premise, he makes the Constitution itself
invalid and some of the other amendments null and void.
Those things which he values so highly and cherishes as
a precious heritage in his heart, he condemns by his reasoning.
Let us look at this matter from an historical standpoint
and see if it will stand the light of day from Mr. Root's.
viewpoint.
When the Constitutional Convention adjourned and
walked out of that room on the first floor of the building
on Chestnut Street, Philadelphia, the legislature of Pennsylvania was in session in the room directly overhead. The.
results of the convention were made known to the upstairs
body. It was received with ominous silence. Directly
two parties arose-those for and those against the Constitution. The proponents were in the majority. The
minority members concluded that the best way to de-
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feat a ratification was to absent themselves from the sessions of the legislature-and prevent a call for a convention
of the people's delegates. This they did, but the majority,
with the assistance of a mob of Philadelphia citizens, broke
into the lodging of two members of the minority party and
kidnapped them, carried them to the State house, thrust
them through the door of the assembly room, locked the
door, and the Speaker counted an exact quorum. 2 The
legislature called a convention by the vote of that quorumseventeen members being absent. On the authority of that
call, Pennsylvania, the second largest state, was the second
to ratify the Constitution. In the light of subsequent
events, the reader may well ask himself the question, "after
all have not the people of these United States got a 'kidnapped Constitution' ?"
Pennsylvania, geographically situated between the
Northern and Southern states, having vital interests in
both sections, was easily the key to the whole problem of
ratification.
All eyes in all the states were turned toward her. If
the Constitution failed in that state then everybody conceded that it was doomed.
But Pennsylvania "found a way" to do it, and it was
done. However, the call being made by violent, criminal
and illegal methods, the ratification was invalid and null
and void.
Who will have the hardihood to deny that the second
most powerful State in America had a far reaching influence on the actions of other States yet to raitfy?
Mr. James M. Beck, ex-Solicitor General of the United
States, says that had not Pennsylvania promptly ratified
the Constitution and set the example, it is probable that
Massachusetts, the third largest State, would not have
ratified, and if neither had ratified, Virginia and New
York would not have done so.3
Mr. Beck is only voicing the belief of the people of
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those States at the time and most Constitutional writers
since.
The delegates to the Massachusett's Convention were
in a large majority opposed to ratification. The final
vote was 187 to 168. A change of ten votes would have
been fatal. Those ten votes held the balance of power and
were originally opposed to the Constitution. What influence brought them over? Many answers have been sponsored. But after all has been said, it is a great strain on
one's credulity not to believe that those ten men would have
remained steadfast with their convictions had Pennsylvania
rejected the Contistution. Thus Massachusetts, the third
largest State in the Union, ratified through an unholy influence exerted upon her, and that influence tainted with
illegality.
New Hampshire is in the same category with Massachusetts. Her delegates were overwhelmingly opposed
to ratification and with definite instructions to oppose the
Constitution. Its convention was adjourned to a later date
to allow delegates to confer with their constituents. Finally, the majority was eleven votes in favor. A change of
six votes would have defeated ratification. Who is so temerious to deny that the action of Pennsylvania and Massachusetts converted those six voters and brought them over
to the Constitution. Three states ratified the Constitutionthe first, invalid and void; the second, poisoned by the first;
and the third, contaminated by both.
But that is not the worst of the story. Let us go to
Virginia. Here was a long bitter struggle with giants
contending for and against. A large majority of the delegates were opposed to ratification. Many were instructed
to vote against the Constitution. The resolution before the
convention at first included a "condition." By a close vote,
the condition was stricken out, but unfortunately it had a
"sleeper" in it in the form of a reservation thus, "the powers granted under the Constitution being derived from the
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people of the United States may be 'resumed' by them
whensoever the same shall be perverted to their injury and
oppression". The vote was 89 to 79 for the resolution with
the "sleeper" in it. Madison said the reservation was not
a "condition". Mason, Henry, Monroe and others said it
was. The Virginia Resolutions of 1798, written by Madison, advocating nullification, by inference affirmed the
"reservation as a condition". The ordinance of secession of
Virginia,' May 17, 1861, reaffirmed it as a "condition", and
through all the intervening years, the people of Virginia so
held.
Ten men in that convention had positive instructions
to vote against ratification. Those ten voted contrary to
instructions. Ten men violated a sacred trust. The ten
faith breakers and trust violators converted a defeat into
a victory for the Constitution with the "sleeper" tacked
on. That reservation from the standpoint of law was a
condition. A conditional ratification is no ratification, and
the Virginia act was invalid and null and void.
So much for Virginia, what about New York? The
resolution in this state for ratification had the same "sleeper" in it as Virginia with this difference. The word "reassumed" was used in the place of "resumed." "Condition"
was also in it. By a large majority, "condition" was stricken out. Rhode Island used the same language as did New
York.
Madison wrote a letter to the Poughkeepsie Convention, giving as his opinion that "reassumed" was not a
condition, and the effect was "reassumed" 5 stayed in.
But a stronger case of invalidity can be made out
against the New York ratification. There were 57 members present on the day of the vote. Four members were
absent-total 61 elected.
The vote stood 30 for and 27
against. Thirty-one was a majority of all the members.
Thirty being only a majority of a quorum the vote was
illegal, and therefore, the act of ratification was invalid
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and null and void.
Rhode Island is an exact parallel to New York. The
Constitution there was finally ratified by a majority of two
votes, two members being absent. The vote in favor was
only one-half of all the members elected and not a majority, therefore ,the act of Rhode Island was invalid and
void.0
Pennsylvania, call for convention invalid-majority of
a quorum and that quorum kidnapped; Virginia, ratification invalid-bad faith and conditional; New York, ratification invalid-majority of d quorum, besides conditional;
Rhode Island, ratification invalid-majority of a quorum!
Thus to this unhappy and dreary revelation Mr. Root's
reasoning leads us, sanctioned by Dr. Nicholas Murray
Butler, of Columbia University.
Yet it may be argued, leaving out all these invalid
ratifications, we still have nine valid ratifications, enough
to make the Constitution legal, valid and effective. The
bad acts of the four states would not have changed the
result. That will depend upon the question whether or not
the four illegal and invalid acts poison the whole proceeding.
For argument's sake, the point will be conceded that
the final result would not have been changed by the four
illegal state acts. But we have proved the contention
that the hisory of legislative bodies in the United States,
customs, precedent, rules and regulations of procedure
sanction the effectiveness of votes of majorities, of quorums
and this is the object of this discussion.
But this argument is not ended yet. We have somewhat more to do with that 13th amendment. If Mr. Root's
reasoning had prevailed, which, thanks to a unanimous
decision of the nine judges of our Supreme Court, it did
not, and the same reasoning had been directed or still
might be directed against the 13th amendment, there might
have been, and still might be, consequences so astounding
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as to stagger all human imagination. We shudder at the
thoughts of it.
On Sept. 22, 1862, President Lincoln issued his Emancipation Proclamation. On Jan. 1st, 1863, it went into effect
freeing 4,000,000 human beings. Mr. Lincoln always had
his doubts whether that proclamation or the results of it,
would be permanent after the necessity was removed.
To allay all doubt, he studiously set himself to the task
of influencing Congress to propose an amendment to the
Constitution, thus placing the seal on what he had done
as a military necessity. In Dec. 1863, a resolution was introduced in the House to that effect. In Jan. 1864, a
like resolution was introduced in the Senate. On April
8th, following, the Senate voted. The vote was favorable
to the resolution 38 to 6, more than a two-thirds majority
by far. But in the House there was no such good fortune.
It failed by 93 to 65. Mr. Ashley, of Ohio, changed his
vote from yes to no, and moved a reconsideration. On
Jan. 28th, 1865, on reconsideration the house voted again,
this time 119 to 56, and the resolution was declared passed
amid a great demonstration of members and spectators.
There were 183 members of the House; 175 were present.
Eight Democrats were absent purposely to let it carry.
They were unwilling to vote for, but would not vote against
it. There were just 3 votes short of the two-thirds majority
of all the members of the House.7 Thus, by Mr. Root's
reasoning, the 13th amendment, being passed by two-thirds
of a quorum and not two-thirds of all the members of the
House, is invalid and null and void; the liberty of multiplied
millions of human beings in America, in this Springtime of
the Twentieth Century, is shrouded in doubt and gloom and
in imminent jeopardy.
What about the 14th amendment? Does this one stand
on any better footing than the 13th? This amendment
affects not only the liberty, but the lives and property of
all the citizens of the United States, black or white. When

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
this amendment was proposed in the Senate, discussed, and
voted on, the result was 33 ayes and 1I noes. The Senate
consisted of 50 members. Forty-four voted. Six were absent or not voting. Of those voting, it carried by a threefourths majority. It failed to carry a two-thirds majority
of all the members elected by one-third of one vote, and
therefore, was invalid and null and void."
But someone says, you are quibbling, you can't split a
vote and the fraction is unimportant and trivial. The point
will be yielded for it is not needed, for a very good reason,
and here it is.
On June 13, 1866, the House took up the resolution as
it came from the Senate in the above condition. After a
brief discussion, the vote was taken, resulting in ayes 120,
noes 32, far more than the necessary two-thirds majority of
those voting. One hundred and fifty-two votes were cast.
Yet there were 193 members of the House elected. Fortyone members were absent or not voting. Thus, while the
resolution carried by a large majority of a quorum, still it
lacked eight and two-thirds votes of being a two-thirds majority of the whole House, therefore, it was invalid and null
and void.
Is there any one in these United States who can believe
that the "tall, slim, acknowledged leader of the American
bar," the hero of Dr. Nicholas Murray Butler, or the doctor
himself, were either of them, ignorant of these facts of
history of Constitutional legislation? Both of them are to
be presumed to be great students, profound students of
American history.
Mr. Root is a corporation lawyer as
well as a constitutional lawyer, and many times has stood
before that same Supreme Court, and advocated the causes of rich clients for the rights accuring under the 14th
amendment; contending against the encroachments of the
"equal protection of the laws," the "due process of law"
clause, the "privileges and immunities" clause, and rightly
so. But how could he do it, though, knowing it was se-
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cured in a manner not legal, and one which he subsequently
condemned when arguing against the 18th amendment.
If he was right when arguing for the 14th amendment,
he was wrong when arguing against 'the 18th. He can
not blow hot and cold at the same time. From his own
mouth, he condemns himself.
How about the 15th amendment! Does this one stand
on any better footing than the last two? In Feb. 1868,
after all the late seceeding states, except Georgia, Mississippi and Texas, had been restored to representation in
Congress, and the members had taken their seats, the resolution proposing the 15th amendment was taken up.
In the Senate, the vote stood 39 for, and 13 against. There
were 66 members elected. Only 52 voted with the above
result, making a three-quarter majority of the votes cast.
It required 44 votes to make a two-third majority of all the
members. Thus, the vote cast was 5 short of the twothird majority contended for. The House vote was 145
ayes and 44 noes, total 189, making 19 more than a twothird majority of those voting. But there were 230 of the
House elected. Forty one were absent or not voting. Twothirds of 230 makes 153Y5. So the vote cast was actually
81/5 votes short of the two-third majority of the whole
House; 3Y5 votes more than the Senate cast. Both House
and Senate lacking the necessary two-third majority of all
the members of each branch respectively, as contended for,
the 15th amendment as adopted is invalid, and therefore,
null and void.9
Had Mr. Root, in concluding his argument, said,
"Your Honors, I have but two or three minutes remaining,
and in all fairness before closing, I am bound to say to you
that this 18th amendment is invalid and cannot stand. The
Civil war amendments are void for the same reason. In
fact, your Honors, the whole Constitution itself and all
the amendments under it are without law. They are
without authority. Those fifty five drafters of this docu-
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ment did not do that which they were authorized to do,
they broke faith with the people and set up another government which the people had not known. They were faith
breakers and trust violators. And even though the people
might have ratified that which they did, they did not do
it in a valid and legal manner.
The first bad and illegal step, such as was taken by the
legislature of Pennsylvania, in using violent, criminal and
unlawful methods, corrupted the whole proceeding of ratification, and you must hold that this so called government
is no government; the President is an usurper; the Congress
are usurpers, they must abdicate; and you, your Honors,
must vacate this bench and go home, and we will go back
to the only honest-to-goodness government there is, and
that is under the old Articles of Confederation."
Had he made this speech, he would have gotten just
as far and won over just as many of the Court as with the
one he did make-and that was NONE.
Public Opinion:How does the public sentiment, in regard to the adoption and ratification of the 18th amendment, compare with
the same as to the other amendments and the Constitution
itself? This can be answered only by studying thestatistics as shown in the records, all amendments having been
secured by the same procedure.
The Constitution itself became effective, and the Government under it was functioning many months before
North Carolina and Rhode Island ratified. In fact, these
states at first defeated ratification, and finally came in under necessity-they were only making the best of a bad
situation. Hence, the Constitution received the support of
only 84.59% of all the states-15.41% denied it support.
The first ten amendments lacked the support of three states out of 14; Connecticut, Massachusetts and Georgia regarding them so lightly as to ignore them altogether, at
least there is no record of any action-only 78.58% ratified,
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21.42% refused.'0
The 11th amendment was ratified by 11 out of t5 states,
or 73.26% for, and 26.74% refusing. The 12th was acted
upon favorably by 13 out of 17 states, or 76.48% for, and
23.52% against." Nine states failed to support the 13th
and 27 ratified, making 75.07% for, and 24.93% against. 12
Six ratified subsequently, after it went into effect. Six
states failed to ratify the 14th. Thirty supported, making
83.38% for, and 16.62% against.""
Out of 37 states, eight failed to ratify the 15th amendment, or 78.16% for, and 21.84% against. 4 Ten states out
of 48 refused to ratify the 16th, or 80% for, and 20%
against. Twelve out of 48 states opposed the 17th, or 75176
for, and 25% against.' 5 Eleven states thus far have refused the 19th, or 77.91% for, and 22.09% against.'
Of
the 48 states, all but two have ratified the 18th amendment,
or 95.98% for, and only 4.02% against.
In view of these statistics, this last amendment was
more in accord with public sentiment than the Constitution itself by 11.39%: more than the Bill of Rights (first
10 amendments) by 17.4%; more than the l1th amendment
by 22.72%; more than the 12th by 19.5% ; it out did the 13th
by 20.91%; the 14th was distanced by the 18th by 12.6%;
the 15th by 17.82%; the 16th by 15.98%; the 17th by
20.98%; and the 19th by 18.07%.
Before National prohibition came, 33 states had laws
of their own, and either by state wide action or local option
voted 2235 counties of the whole country dry, leaving only
305 where liquor was legal. As to Congressional and legislative action on the 18th amendment, the vote in both
branches of Congress stood 347 for, and 148 against. In
the 48 state legislatures, 5079 voted to ratify and 1265
voted against. Thus, we find, when compared with the
ratifications of the Constitution, and all the other amendments, or when compared with the adverse vote in Congress and the legislatures in the aggregate, the 18th
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amendment makes a far better showing with the public
than any other like action in the history of our country.
Its validity, in the light of history, customs, precedent,
rules and regulations of our deliberative bodies, stands unimpeached and impregnable before the whole world. And
from the beginning of its journey to the end, having to
run the gauntlet of a two-third majority of two houses of
Congress, and majorities of 96 branches of state legislatures, and having successfully run both of the former overwhelmingly, and having run 93 of the latter, and failed in
only three, for one branch of the 47th state ratified; the
18th amendment may rightfully be said to have been sanctioned by the sound of Public Opinion of America.
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MOOT COURT
ALLERS v. DIXON
Contracts--Subsequent Parol Agreement Altering Previous Written
One-Consideration
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Allers and Dixon entered into a contract by which Dixon agreed
to clear a tract of land owned by Allers for the sum of $1,000, to
be paid upon completion of the work. After having entered upon
the work, Dixon got into financial difficulties and was unable to pay
his laborers weekly as required by them. He also found that the
work was to require longer to complete than he had anticipated. He
therefore went to Allers and told him that he would have to abandon
the contract unless he paid him installments of $100 weekly on the
contract price as the work progressed. Allers agreed to do this,
but after having done so, for some reason changed his mind and
relused to make the weekly payments. Dixon abandoned the work.
Allers sues Dixon for breach of contract.
W. S. Shorts, for plaintiff.
J. Levitt, for defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
Magarick, J. In order to reach a logical and correct decision to
the case at bar, we must first solve many perplexing problems with
.which we are confronted.
We start with an original promise on a valid written contract,
and the first of a series of questions which must be answered iswas a subsequent contract entered into by Allers and Dixon, after
Dixon had informed Allers" that he was unable to continue his performance of the first contract. To ascertain this, we must find out
first, whether a written agreement may subsequently be modified by
a new parol agreement, and second, if so, was there sufficient consideration for the parol agreement to make it a valid contract?
13 C. J. 593 tells us that where the requirements of the statute
of frauds does not intervene, as is true in the present case, parties
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to a written agreement may modify it by a subsequent parol agreement. This fact is further substantiated by the following cases:
Producers Coke Co. v. Hoover, 268 Pa. 104; Achenbach v. Stoddard,
253 Pa. 338; Noel v. Kissler, 252 Pa. 244; Beatty v. Larzelere, 194
Pa. 605; Malone v. Phila. R. Co., 157 Pa. 430; Holloway v. Frick,
149 Pa. 178; McNish v. Reynolds, 95 Pa. 483; and McGrann v. North
Lebanon R. Co., 29 Pa. 82.
As to the necessity of consideration, there can be no doubt. A
modification of a contract, which is actually what this amounted to,
being a new contract, requires consideration to support the new
agreement: 13 C. J. 592, Clark on Contracts 137. The cases tending
to strengthen this statement are: Branson v. Kitchenman, 148 Pa.
541; Burnett v. Bisco, 4 Johns (N. Y.) 235; Doebler v. Waters, 30
Ga. 344; McLean v. McBean, 74 Ill. 134; Bailey v. Walker, 29 Mo.
407; and Hendy v. Kier, 59 Cal. 138.
Having disposed of this, our first, we come to our second subdivision. Was there sufficient consideration for the parol agreement
to make it a valid contract? The word "consideration" is variously
defined, but the following, I believe, will suffice for the needs of the
present. Consideration is some legal right, interest, profit, accruing to
one party; or some forbearance, detriment, loss, or responsibility
given, suffered, or undertaken by the other. This definition is made
up, for the most part by the patching up of parts of the doctrines of
the following cases: Presbyterian Board of Foreign Missions v.
Smith, 209 Pa. 361; Hamer v. Sidway, 124 N. Y. 538; Byrne v. Cummings, 41 Miss. 192; Wolford v. Powers, 85 Ind. 294, and many others.
Having defined that for which we seek, our next task is to see
if what we have conforms with our definition. The release of one,
from the stipulations of the original agreement, is the consideration
for the release of the other; and the mutual releases are the consideration for the new contract and are sufficient to give it full legal
effect. The authority for this statement lies in Carrier and Baum
v. Dilworth, 9 Pa. 406; Brown v. Catawba River Lumber Co., 23
S. E. (N. C.) 253; Rollins v. Marsh, 128 Mass. 116; Cutter v. Cochrane, 116 Mass. 408; and again in Brown v. Everhard, 8 N. W.
(Wis.) 725, we have "The same consideration which existed for the
old agreement, is imported into the new agreement, which is substituted for it."
Having arrived at the conclusion, therefore, that there was a
subsequent valid contract, did Aller's failure to perform this new
contract revive the original one. No, and this is definitely so stated in
13 C. J. 596 in the following words: "A failure to perform the new
contract does not revive the old." Nothing more clear or concise
could be desired. This doctrine is reiterated in the cases of Spier
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v. Hyde, 79 N. Y. S. 699; Sioux City Stock Yards Co. v. Sioux City
Packing Co., 110 Iowa 396; Pa. Min. Co. v. Brady, 14 Mich. 260;
Tingley v. Fairhaven Land Co., 36 Pac. (Wash.) 1098, and Andre v.
Graebner, 85 N. W. (Mich.) 464.
With the above statements and conclusions in view, I cannot see
how the plaintiff can possibly claim damages. The breach was his
in refusing to pay the weekly installments which he had agreed to
pay. By not complying with his promise, he knew full well, in view
of what the defendant had told him, that his act was making performance of the contract impossible, and nothing is more definite
than that, if a party to a contract, either before the time for performance, or in the course of performance, makes further performance by him impossible, the other party is not only discharged from
all contractual liability, but may sue the opposite party for a breach
of the contract and recover damages therefore: Clark on Contracts
562, Crabtree v. Messersmith, 19 Iowa 179; Wolf v. Marsh, 54 Cal.
228; Lovering v. Lovering, 13 N. H. 513; Newcomb v. Brackett, 16
Mass. 161; Bolles v. Sachs, 37 Minn. 315; Cooley v. Moss, 123 Ga.
707, and Hunter v. Wenatchee Land Co., 50 Wash. 438.
We therefore arrive at the conclusion that the defendant is not
liable, and that therefore the plaintiff cannot recover in this action.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
The learned court below has correctly held that the contract
entered into was subject to later modification by parol. It was
also correct in holding that the modification is a new contract and
must be supported by a consideration. Further than that, we can
not agree.
In Pennsylvania, the consideration must be a new and independent one, the old not being imported into the contract. Was there
such a consideration here? There was not. The plaintiff has received nothing. The defendant merely promised to do that which
he was already legally bound by contract to do. That such an
agreement is not supported by consideration is well settled in Pennsylvania. See Earny v. Sauer, 234 Pa. 330; Wimer v. Overseers, 104
Pa. 317, and Erb v. Brown, 69 Pa. 216. The learned court below
has found mutual releases as the consideration. But the plaintiff
has not been released from any obligation, rather the obligations
have been increased. Nor did the defendant by his promise forbear
to exercise some right or suffer any detriment. The new contract
being invalid can constitute no defence.
The judgment of the court below is reversed.
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HESS v. COATESVILLE
Constitutional Law-Constitution of Pennsylvania of 1873, Article Ill,
Section 7-Special Law Regulating Judicial Proceeding
Municipalities-Liability for Torts of Servants

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The automobile of the plaintiff, Hess, while parked on a street
in the boro of Coatesville was wrecked by being struck by a fire
engine negligently driven. The town refused to compensate Hess.
The legislature then passed an act compelling the town to pay Hess
$5000. The town still refused to pay after a request and this suit
is to collect the $5000.
Edwards, for plaintiff.
Menkus, for defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
Holl, J. In disposing of the case at bar, it will be necessary
to examine the Constitution of this state. Sec. 7 of Art. 3 provides
that "the general assembly shall not pass any local or special law
regulating the affairs of counties, cities, townships, wards, boroughs
or school districts." We hold that this section is not applicable to
a case like ours. The government of municipal corporations is vested
in the people, and this section was inserted into the Constitution to
prevent local and special legislation as to the government of such
bodies. In the same section, however, we do find a clause which fits
our case, and that is the one which reads that "* * * nor shall any

law be passed granting powers or privileges in any case where the
granting of such powers shall have been provided for by the general
law, nor where the courts have jurisdiction to grant the same or the
relief asked for."
In 19 R. C. L. 1048, Sec. 337, the rule is stated that "it was
never doubted that under proper conditions an action at law might
be maintained against a municipal corporation. Indeed the power to
sue and be sued, as if it were an individual, either in the corporate
name or of that of one of its officers, is generally considered as
one of the essential characteristics of a corporation of any kind.
There can be no doubt then that the municipality of Coatesville can
be sued at law. Hayden v. Middlesex Turnpike Corporation, 10
Mass. 397.
The court has been unable to find the statement cited by the
plaintiff that "there is no constitutional objection to a law which is
in fact applicable to a single city or town even when the town is
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designated by name." The cases cited by him on this point are
Sharpless v. Phila., 21 Pa. 147; Commonwealth v. Alden, 251 Pa.
149; Commonwealth v. Puder, 261 Pa. 129; Shaffer v. Public Service,
268 Pa. 458; Heiser v. Thomas Colliery Co., 274 Pa. 458 and Busser
v. Snyder, 282 Pa. 449; all of which decide that an act of assembly
is void when it plainly and clearly violates the Constitution. As we
have said before, this act does clearly and very plainly violate Sec.
7 of Art. 3.
In support of the plaintiff's contention, that the legislature may
impose liabilities upon a municipal corporation, he has cited 19 R C.
L. 725 which provides in substance that "the legislature is not
bound to leave the liability of a municipal corporation as it was at
common law, but may impose new liabilities whenever they can
fairly be said to arise from the defaults of such bodies". We do
not doubt that the legislature may change the liability of a municipal corporation or may impose such liabilities, but where the liability
is existent, a statute imposing such liability is repugnant to Sec. 7,
Art. 3 of the Constitution and must be declared unconstitutional.
The case of Gianfortone v. City of New Orleans, 61 Fed. 64,
holds that a statute making a municipal corporation liable for the
destruction of property by mobs does not include liability for taking
of life. This case is in no respect authority in the case at bar.
The case of Winter v. Niagara Falls, 190 N. Y. 198 holds, as
the plaintiff has stated, that "the legislature may impose pecuniary
obligations not cognizable in law or in equity, but in good conscience, arising out of injuries caused by the negligence of the municipalities' serveants."
The same rule is set out in 8 Cyc. 943,
but is not applicable to our case because the claim of this plaintiff
is enforceable at law.
We think that the law on the subject has been sufficiently
reviewed, and judgment will accordingly be rendered for the defendant.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
Even a cursory examination of the available cases on the liability
of a municipality for the negligence of its servants would have disclosed that the ground adopted by the learned court below to sustain its judgment was untenable.
A municipality is not liable for the torts of its servants, when
engaged in governmental functions, with some exceptions not important here: Scibilia v. Phila., 279 Pa. 549, 556. Hence the holding that
the act in question is unconstitutional, because there is a relief available at law, is incorrect and unjustifiable.
Article III, Section 7 of the Constitution of 1873, prohibits the
legislature from passing any special law regulating the practice or
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jurisdiction of * * * any judicial proceeding. Collins v. Comm., 262
Pa. 572 holds that this prohibits the passage of an act authorizing
an individual to sue the Commonwealth. If this be true, such an
act authorizing a suit against a municipality is equally objectional
and we so hold. Such an act as this was one of the very evils
cured by our Constitution.
The judgment of the learned court below is affirmed, not on its
reasons, but on those above cited.

COUNSUL v. HEALEY
Bankruptcy-Discharge of Debtor-Landlord and Tenant-Right of
Landlord to Distrain on Goods of Third Person on PresimesDischarge in Bankruptcy of Debtor Tenant No Bar to
Distraint for Prior Rent against Third Perons' Property

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The plaintiff's husband, who was the tenant of property belonging

to the defendant, was indebted on August 1, 1926 to the defendant
in the sum of $100 for rent in arrears. On this day, the tenant was
adjudicated a voluntary bankrupt. The defendant proved his debt but
subsequently withdrew his claim. On March 1, 1927, the defendant
distrained on goods of the plaintiff on the property, the husband
having no goods of his own on the property. Plaintiff brought replevin for goods, the husband having been granted a discharge on
February 1, 1927.
C. Blitz, for plaintiff.
Cobb, for defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
M. Cohen, J. The sole question to be decided by this court is,
whether or not the discharge of the husband of the plaintiff was of
such effect as to render the seizure of the plaintiff's goods by the
defendant a conversion, for which the plaintiff's action of replevin
will lie. This brings up the question as to what the effect of a discharge really is.
"A discharge in bankruptcy is conclusive against any future liability of the bankrupt with respect to the debt which the statute
provides shall be released * * * , it constitutes a perfect defense to
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an action on a debt barred thereby, and a state court is bound to
take notice of such discharge when properly pleaded". 7 C. J. 395.
There has been one complete and due adjudication by a court of
competent jurisdiction in which the defendant had full opportunity
for a hearing, and it is manifest that he had no remaining legal status
or right to ignore said adjudication and reopen said question by undertaking to seize the property of the plaintiff. See Claster v. Soble,
22 Pa. Sup. 631; May v. Merchants' and Mechanics' Bank, 109 Pa. 145.
"The discharge of a bankrupt releases all his debts which are
provable in bankruptcy, except such as are excepted by act of Congress: Zeigler v. Weil, 21 Pa. Dist. Rep. 809. The debt at bar
was not excepted by act of Congress.
In Miller v. Black, 10 Pa. Dist. Rep. 255, Judge Lindsey says, "a
decree of bankruptcy is in effect an extinguishment of the personal
liability of the plaintiff for the defendant's debt."
A discharge, that did not discharge, would be of no value whatever to a business man, and if a debt such as the one involved in this
case could be enforced after a discharge in bankruptcy, all the
beneficient effects of the bankrupt law for business men, and the
community in general, would be entirely lost: Claster v. Soble, 22
Pa. Sup. 631.
The goods of a wife on the demised premises may be seized for
rent: Swaney v. Downont, 44 Pa. Sup. 49; Blanche v. Bradford, 38
Pa. 344; 36 C. J. 550-551. This is true, but where a man has been
adjudicated a bankrupt, all those seeking remedy have had ample
time to file their claims upon petition of the bankrupt. The defendant had a provable claim and did file it but later withdrew it, which
is his .privilege, but also his misfortune. He cannot later seek redress
or attempt to be restricted by a seizure of goods of the plaintiff.
This is in direct contravention of the Bankrupt Act, which gives a
man a fresh start in life. The defendant should have allowed his
claim to stand. In not doing so, he lost all possible chance of recovering anything at all. In his distraint upon the plaintiff's goods,
he committed a clear act of conversion; an act done whereby the
defendant exercised some right of ownership, inconsistent with, or in
denial of, the right of ownership in the plaintiff.
As a result, we conclude that the plaintiff's action of replevin
will lie, and accordingly render a verdict in favor of the plaintiff.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
The primary purpose of the Bankruptcy Act is to secure the
equitable division of the debtor's property among his creditors. That
this distress proceeding will not defeat this purpose, but rather enhance the property available to the other creditors, is patent.
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What is the effect of a discharge of the debtor? It does not
extinguish the debt nor pay it. It is simply a bar to the enforcement
of the debt against him. Consequently, the discharge did not destroy
the debt so that there is no debt on which distress may lie. In
England, it has been held that a discharge in bankruptcy does not
destroy the right of the landlord to distrain on goods of a third
person on the premises: 36 C. J. 558. The same has been held in
Winter v. Henden, 136 Atd. 280 (Del.). The right to distrain on goods
of the tenant is removed, but not on that of third persons.
The judgment of the learned court below is reversed.

COMMONWEALTH v. HYMAN
Crimes--Murder--Intent-Party Killed, One of Defendant's Side in
an Affray

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendant engaged in a street fight in which several participated
on each side. One of the participants upon the defendant's side was
shot and killed by one upon the other side. On a trial for homicide,
the court charged the jury that upon the above facts he could be
found guilty as a principal in the second degree. Defendant was
convicted and appeals.
Burwell, for Commonwealth.
Canter, for defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
Colbus, J. The case at bar presents two questions for this court
to decide. First, can a participant of an affray which results in death
be convicted as a principal in the second degree on an indictment of
homicide in Pennsylvania? Second, is a charge to the jury, that
the prisoner may be so convicted, reversible error? The answer to
the first question will necessarily govern the court's decision in regard
to the second question and the decision of this case.
"Where killing occurs in the course of a joint assault or affray,
in the absence of a common design, it must be shown that defendant
struck the fatal blow, or aided and abetted therein. A conviction may
of course be sustained on sufficient proof of such active participation by the defendant; but, where a common design to kill is established, such proof is unnecessary, and where defendant was present,
encouraging the commission of the crime, it is not necessary to show
that he struck the fatal blow": 30 C. J. 301 D.
This question was settled in 1844, in Pennsylvania, in the case of
Commonwealth v. Hare, 2 Clark 257, which is analagous to the case

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
What is the effect of a discharge of the debtor? It does not
extinguish the debt nor pay it. It is simply a bar to the enforcement
of the debt against him. Consequently, the discharge did not destroy
the debt so that there is no debt on which distress may lie. In
England, it has been held that a discharge in bankruptcy does not
destroy the right of the landlord to distrain on goods of a third
person on the premises: 36 C. J. 558. The same has been held in
Winter v. Henden, 136 Atd. 280 (Del.). The right to distrain on goods
of the tenant is removed, but not on that of third persons.
The judgment of the learned court below is reversed.

COMMONWEALTH v. HYMAN
Crimes--Murder--Intent-Party Killed, One of Defendant's Side in
an Affray

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendant engaged in a street fight in which several participated
on each side. One of the participants upon the defendant's side was
shot and killed by one upon the other side. On a trial for homicide,
the court charged the jury that upon the above facts he could be
found guilty as a principal in the second degree. Defendant was
convicted and appeals.
Burwell, for Commonwealth.
Canter, for defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
Colbus, J. The case at bar presents two questions for this court
to decide. First, can a participant of an affray which results in death
be convicted as a principal in the second degree on an indictment of
homicide in Pennsylvania? Second, is a charge to the jury, that
the prisoner may be so convicted, reversible error? The answer to
the first question will necessarily govern the court's decision in regard
to the second question and the decision of this case.
"Where killing occurs in the course of a joint assault or affray,
in the absence of a common design, it must be shown that defendant
struck the fatal blow, or aided and abetted therein. A conviction may
of course be sustained on sufficient proof of such active participation by the defendant; but, where a common design to kill is established, such proof is unnecessary, and where defendant was present,
encouraging the commission of the crime, it is not necessary to show
that he struck the fatal blow": 30 C. J. 301 D.
This question was settled in 1844, in Pennsylvania, in the case of
Commonwealth v. Hare, 2 Clark 257, which is analagous to the case

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
at bar. In that case, a fight with fire arms took place between two
separate bodies in a public street, and from a simultaneous fire innocent citizens were killed by the missiles discharged. Held, both
bodies were chargeable wth felonious homicide; though it seems
that in Pennsylvania, from the want of such particular malice as is
required by the Act of 1860, the offense is murder in the second
degree. This doctrine is clearly applicable to the facts at bar.
The prisoner's contention, that because he opposed the force
from which the fatal shot was sent, he is released as aider and abetter,
is not tenable. It is sufficient that he was engaged in the unlawful
act. Masses of men have no more right to engage in such general
and mutual combat, than individuals have to array themselves against
each other in private duel. If life is taken, the offenders, their aiders
and abetters, are guilty of felonious homicide. The law does not
stop to inquire into the relative merits of such violators of the public
peace, but regards them all as subject to censure and punishment.
At common law, such a homicide would be murder, but it is
reduced however by the revised Criminal Code of 1860 to murder of
the second degree. We have not a semblance of doubt that the
prisoner is guilty as a principal in the second degree.
Therefore, we must answer the second question, "Is such a charge
to the jury reversible error?" in the negative, and sustain the charge
of the learned court below.
CONVICTIONS AFFIRMED.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
A principal in the second degree is one present at the time and
place of commission, aiding and abetting, but not directly causing
the death. Comm. v. De Leo, 242 Pa. 510 is illustrative of the principle that concert of action is a requisite. It is essential that he
share in the intent of the direct actor. Can it be said that Hyman
shared in the intent of his opponents to kill one on his own side?
Was he aiding and abetting in the killing of his own comrade? We
think not. Such a conclusion would justify the conviction of a man
when his intent was diametrically opposed to the act done. It is
conceded that where an opponent is killed, he is aiding and abetting
and may be convicted. No Pennsylvania case on similar facts has
been found and hence we are controlled by no precedents. The authorities and cases cited by counsel for the defendant apply the
correct principles and rule our decision. Comm. v. Hare, 2 Clark 467
is not controlling. As to innocent third persons not participating
in the affray, the defendant could doubtless be convicted. He is
aiding and abetting in such a possible killing. It is no authority for
a killing of one aiding the defendant.
The judgment of the learned court below is reversed.

